Opened 11 years ago

#16 new enhancement

Privacy behavior is confusing

Reported by: hkaplan@… Owned by:
Priority: minor Milestone: milestone1
Component: rfc4244bis Version: 2.0
Severity: In WG Last Call Keywords:
Cc:

Description

[I'm submitting this ticket because when I read the draft the first few times, it kept annoying me. But it could easily just be me and no one else.]

Maybe it's just me, but I've read the draft multiple times and I find the Privacy header stuff for anonymizing H-I headers to be really confusing. In RFC 3323, the idea was for providing privacy of the *originator* information. New headers could stipulate they also reveal such information and thus should be anonymized, but it's really debatable if H-I entries reveal information about the *originator*, vs. the target.

The only way I can see they reveal originator info is because they can reveal the IP Address of the originator's proxy, or originator's domain, because Alice may send the request to sip:Bob@aliceproxy.com. But in that context, it's true the aliceproxy.com H-I has to be anonymized, but clearly not sip:Bob@bobsproxy.com once aliceproxy retargets to that. Furthermore, by forcing all H-I entries to be anonymized, it breaks the use of H-I for some pretty important uses. You could say "well that's what anonymization means", but that's not true - it is NOT the case that a caller-id anonymized call does not get the right voicemail or ACD service. Because "anonymized" calls are about originator information, not destination information. After all, the destination *knows* who you're calling... it's not a secret to Bob that you called Bob!

What the draft needs to do is explain there are multiple "types" of Privacy: privacy to anonymize the originator, privacy to anonymize diverting targets from subsequent targets and the originator, and privacy to anonymize the final reached target from the originator. The last two happen to work the same way: through the Privacy header being embedded in the H-I entries of responses. The draft then needs to explain *why* the first case of originator information could be revealed by H-I, and why there needs to be support for anonymizing all the H-I's using the Privacy header for that first case.

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