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Changes between Initial Version and Version 1 of Ticket #144

-                      initial
+                      v1
 Current browser implementations often omit the Referer header, even when there is a URI available. From the source e-mail;
 ) The attacker hosts his HTML page over HTTPS and mounts a CSRF
+. The attacker hosts his HTML page over HTTPS and mounts a CSRF
 attack against an HTTP URL.
 ) The attacker hosts his HTML page over FTP.  Browsers don't send FTP
+. The attacker hosts his HTML page over FTP.  Browsers don't send FTP
 URLs in the Referer header.
 ) The attacker hosts his HTML page over GOPHER.  Browsers don't send
+. The attacker hosts his HTML page over GOPHER.  Browsers don't send
 GOPHER URLs in the Referer header
 ) The attacker hosts his HTML in a DATA URL.  Browser don't send DATA
+. The attacker hosts his HTML in a DATA URL.  Browser don't send DATA
 URLs in the Referer header.
 ) The attacker hosts his HTML in a frame whose URL is the empty string.
+. The attacker hosts his HTML in a frame whose URL is the empty string.
 Referer's definition should be clarified to state that it (SHOULD|MUST) be sent for non-HTTP URIs. Additionally, it may be worth considering specifying a special value (e.g., "null") to be sent when there is no referer.