source: draft-ietf-httpbis/orig/rfc2818.html @ 598

Last change on this file since 598 was 598, checked in by julian.reschke@…, 11 years ago

fix Makefile, add RFC 2817/2818, re-gen HTML

  • Property svn:eol-style set to native
  • Property svn:mime-type set to text/html
File size: 29.7 KB
1<!DOCTYPE html
2  PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01//EN">
3<html lang="en">
4   <head profile="">
5      <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
6      <title>HTTP Over TLS</title><style type="text/css" title="Xml2Rfc (sans serif)">
7a {
8  text-decoration: none;
10a.smpl {
11  color: black;
13a:hover {
14  text-decoration: underline;
16a:active {
17  text-decoration: underline;
19address {
20  margin-top: 1em;
21  margin-left: 2em;
22  font-style: normal;
24body {
25  color: black;
26  font-family: verdana, helvetica, arial, sans-serif;
27  font-size: 10pt;
29cite {
30  font-style: normal;
32dd {
33  margin-right: 2em;
35dl {
36  margin-left: 2em;
39dl.empty dd {
40  margin-top: .5em;
42dl p {
43  margin-left: 0em;
45dt {
46  margin-top: .5em;
48h1 {
49  font-size: 14pt;
50  line-height: 21pt;
51  page-break-after: avoid;
52} {
54  page-break-before: always;
56h1 a {
57  color: #333333;
59h2 {
60  font-size: 12pt;
61  line-height: 15pt;
62  page-break-after: avoid;
64h3, h4, h5, h6 {
65  font-size: 10pt;
66  page-break-after: avoid;
68h2 a, h3 a, h4 a, h5 a, h6 a {
69  color: black;
71img {
72  margin-left: 3em;
74li {
75  margin-left: 2em;
76  margin-right: 2em;
78ol {
79  margin-left: 2em;
80  margin-right: 2em;
82ol p {
83  margin-left: 0em;
85p {
86  margin-left: 2em;
87  margin-right: 2em;
89pre {
90  margin-left: 3em;
91  background-color: lightyellow;
92  padding: .25em;
94pre.text2 {
95  border-style: dotted;
96  border-width: 1px;
97  background-color: #f0f0f0;
98  width: 69em;
100pre.inline {
101  background-color: white;
102  padding: 0em;
104pre.text {
105  border-style: dotted;
106  border-width: 1px;
107  background-color: #f8f8f8;
108  width: 69em;
110pre.drawing {
111  border-style: solid;
112  border-width: 1px;
113  background-color: #f8f8f8;
114  padding: 2em;
116table {
117  margin-left: 2em;
119table.header {
120  width: 95%;
121  font-size: 10pt;
122  color: white;
123} {
125  vertical-align: top;
127td.topnowrap {
128  vertical-align: top;
129  white-space: nowrap; 
131td.header {
132  background-color: gray;
133  width: 50%;
135td.reference {
136  vertical-align: top;
137  white-space: nowrap;
138  padding-right: 1em;
140thead {
141  display:table-header-group;
143ul.toc {
144  list-style: none;
145  margin-left: 1.5em;
146  margin-right: 0em;
147  padding-left: 0em;
149li.tocline0 {
150  line-height: 150%;
151  font-weight: bold;
152  font-size: 10pt;
153  margin-left: 0em;
154  margin-right: 0em;
156li.tocline1 {
157  line-height: normal;
158  font-weight: normal;
159  font-size: 9pt;
160  margin-left: 0em;
161  margin-right: 0em;
163li.tocline2 {
164  font-size: 0pt;
166ul p {
167  margin-left: 0em;
169ul.ind {
170  list-style: none;
171  margin-left: 1.5em;
172  margin-right: 0em;
173  padding-left: 0em;
174  page-break-before: avoid;
176li.indline0 {
177  font-weight: bold;
178  line-height: 200%;
179  margin-left: 0em;
180  margin-right: 0em;
182li.indline1 {
183  font-weight: normal;
184  line-height: 150%;
185  margin-left: 0em;
186  margin-right: 0em;
188.bcp14 {
189  font-style: normal;
190  text-transform: lowercase;
191  font-variant: small-caps;
193.comment {
194  background-color: yellow;
195} {
197  text-align: center;
199.error {
200  color: red;
201  font-style: italic;
202  font-weight: bold;
204.figure {
205  font-weight: bold;
206  text-align: center;
207  font-size: 9pt;
209.filename {
210  color: #333333;
211  font-weight: bold;
212  font-size: 12pt;
213  line-height: 21pt;
214  text-align: center;
216.fn {
217  font-weight: bold;
219.hidden {
220  display: none;
222.left {
223  text-align: left;
225.right {
226  text-align: right;
228.title {
229  color: #990000;
230  font-size: 18pt;
231  line-height: 18pt;
232  font-weight: bold;
233  text-align: center;
234  margin-top: 36pt;
236.vcardline {
237  display: block;
239.warning {
240  font-size: 14pt;
241  background-color: yellow;
245@media print {
246  .noprint {
247    display: none;
248  }
250  a {
251    color: black;
252    text-decoration: none;
253  }
255  table.header {
256    width: 90%;
257  }
259  td.header {
260    width: 50%;
261    color: black;
262    background-color: white;
263    vertical-align: top;
264    font-size: 12pt;
265  }
267  ul.toc a::after {
268    content: leader('.') target-counter(attr(href), page);
269  }
271  a.iref {
272    content: target-counter(attr(href), page);
273  }
275  .print2col {
276    column-count: 2;
277    -moz-column-count: 2;
278    column-fill: auto;
279  }
282@page {
283  @top-left {
284       content: "RFC 2818"; 
285  } 
286  @top-right {
287       content: "May 2000"; 
288  } 
289  @top-center {
290       content: "HTTP Over TLS"; 
291  } 
292  @bottom-left {
293       content: "Rescorla"; 
294  } 
295  @bottom-center {
296       content: "Informational"; 
297  } 
298  @bottom-right {
299       content: "[Page " counter(page) "]"; 
300  } 
303@page:first { 
304    @top-left {
305      content: normal;
306    }
307    @top-right {
308      content: normal;
309    }
310    @top-center {
311      content: normal;
312    }
314</style><link rel="Contents" href="#rfc.toc">
315      <link rel="Author" href="#rfc.authors">
316      <link rel="Copyright" href="#rfc.copyright">
317      <link rel="Index" href="#rfc.index">
318      <link rel="Chapter" title="1 Introduction" href="#rfc.section.1">
319      <link rel="Chapter" title="2 HTTP Over TLS" href="#rfc.section.2">
320      <link rel="Chapter" title="3 Endpoint Identification" href="#rfc.section.3">
321      <link rel="Chapter" href="#rfc.section.4" title="4 References">
322      <link rel="Appendix" title="A Security Considerations" href="#rfc.section.A">
323      <link rel="Alternate" title="Authorative ASCII Version" href="">
324      <link rel="Help" title="Additional Information on" href="">
325      <meta name="generator" content=", Revision 1.438, 2009-05-27 13:34:05, XSLT vendor: SAXON 8.9 from Saxonica">
326      <link rel="schema.DC" href="">
327      <meta name="DC.Creator" content="Rescorla, E.">
328      <meta name="DC.Identifier" content="urn:ietf:rfc:2818">
329      <meta name="DC.Date.Issued" scheme="ISO8601" content="2000-05">
330      <meta name="DC.Description.Abstract" content="This memo describes how to use TLS to secure HTTP connections over the Internet. Current practice is to layer HTTP over SSL (the predecessor to TLS), distinguishing secured traffic from insecure traffic by the use of a different server port. This document documents that practice using TLS. A companion document describes a method for using HTTP/TLS over the same port as normal HTTP [RFC2817].">
331      <meta name="DC.isPartOf" content="urn:ISSN:2070-1721">
332   </head>
333   <body>
334      <table summary="header information" class="header" border="0" cellpadding="1" cellspacing="1">
335         <tr>
336            <td class="header left">Network Working Group</td>
337            <td class="header right">E. Rescorla</td>
338         </tr>
339         <tr>
340            <td class="header left">Request for Comments: 2818</td>
341            <td class="header right">RTFM, Inc.</td>
342         </tr>
343         <tr>
344            <td class="header left">Category: Informational</td>
345            <td class="header right">May 2000</td>
346         </tr>
347      </table>
348      <p class="title">HTTP Over TLS</p>
349      <h1><a id="rfc.status" href="#rfc.status">Status of This Memo</a></h1>
350      <p>This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution
351         of this memo is unlimited.
352      </p>
353      <h1><a id="rfc.copyrightnotice" href="#rfc.copyrightnotice">Copyright Notice</a></h1>
354      <p>Copyright © The Internet Society (2000). All Rights Reserved.</p>
355      <h1 id="rfc.abstract"><a href="#rfc.abstract">Abstract</a></h1> 
356      <p>This memo describes how to use TLS to secure HTTP connections over the Internet. Current practice is to layer HTTP over SSL
357         (the predecessor to TLS), distinguishing secured traffic from insecure traffic by the use of a different server port. This
358         document documents that practice using TLS. A companion document describes a method for using HTTP/TLS over the same port
359         as normal HTTP [RFC2817].
360      </p> 
361      <hr class="noprint">
362      <h1 class="np" id="rfc.toc"><a href="#rfc.toc">Table of Contents</a></h1>
363      <ul class="toc">
364         <li class="tocline0">1.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#rfc.section.1">Introduction</a><ul class="toc">
365               <li class="tocline1">1.1&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#rfc.section.1.1">Requirements Terminology</a></li>
366            </ul>
367         </li>
368         <li class="tocline0">2.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#rfc.section.2">HTTP Over TLS</a><ul class="toc">
369               <li class="tocline1">2.1&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#rfc.section.2.1">Connection Initiation</a></li>
370               <li class="tocline1">2.2&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#rfc.section.2.2">Connection Closure</a><ul class="toc">
371                     <li class="tocline1">2.2.1&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#rfc.section.2.2.1">Client Behavior</a></li>
372                     <li class="tocline1">2.2.2&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#rfc.section.2.2.2">Server Behavior</a></li>
373                  </ul>
374               </li>
375               <li class="tocline1">2.3&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#rfc.section.2.3">Port Number</a></li>
376               <li class="tocline1">2.4&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#rfc.section.2.4">URI Format</a></li>
377            </ul>
378         </li>
379         <li class="tocline0">3.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#rfc.section.3">Endpoint Identification</a><ul class="toc">
380               <li class="tocline1">3.1&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#rfc.section.3.1">Server Identity</a></li>
381               <li class="tocline1">3.2&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#rfc.section.3.2">Client Identity</a></li>
382            </ul>
383         </li>
384         <li class="tocline0">4.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#rfc.references">References</a></li>
385         <li class="tocline0"><a href="#rfc.authors">Author's Address</a></li>
386         <li class="tocline0">A.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#rfc.section.A">Security Considerations</a></li>
387         <li class="tocline0"><a href="#rfc.ipr">Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements</a></li>
388         <li class="tocline0"><a href="#rfc.index">Index</a></li>
389      </ul>
390      <h1 id="rfc.section.1" class="np"><a href="#rfc.section.1">1.</a>&nbsp;Introduction
391      </h1>
392      <p id="rfc.section.1.p.1">HTTP <a href="#RFC2616"><cite title="Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1">[RFC2616]</cite></a> was originally used in the clear on the Internet. However, increased use of HTTP for sensitive applications has required security
393         measures. SSL, and its successor TLS <a href="#RFC2246"><cite title="The TLS Protocol Version 1.0">[RFC2246]</cite></a> were designed to provide channel-oriented security. This document describes how to use HTTP over TLS.
394      </p>
395      <h2 id="rfc.section.1.1"><a href="#rfc.section.1.1">1.1</a>&nbsp;Requirements Terminology
396      </h2>
397      <p id="rfc.section.1.1.p.1">Keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT" and "MAY" that appear in this document are to be interpreted
398         as described in <a href="#RFC2119"><cite title="Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels">[RFC2119]</cite></a>.
399      </p>
400      <h1 id="rfc.section.2"><a href="#rfc.section.2">2.</a>&nbsp;HTTP Over TLS
401      </h1>
402      <p id="rfc.section.2.p.1">Conceptually, HTTP/TLS is very simple. Simply use HTTP over TLS precisely as you would use HTTP over TCP.</p>
403      <h2 id="rfc.section.2.1"><a href="#rfc.section.2.1">2.1</a>&nbsp;Connection Initiation
404      </h2>
405      <p id="rfc.section.2.1.p.1">The agent acting as the HTTP client should also act as the TLS client. It should initiate a connection to the server on the
406         appropriate port and then send the TLS ClientHello to begin the TLS handshake. When the TLS handshake has finished. The client
407         may then initiate the first HTTP request. All HTTP data <em class="bcp14">MUST</em> be sent as TLS "application data". Normal HTTP behavior, including retained connections should be followed.
408      </p>
409      <h2 id="rfc.section.2.2"><a href="#rfc.section.2.2">2.2</a>&nbsp;Connection Closure
410      </h2>
411      <p id="rfc.section.2.2.p.1">TLS provides a facility for secure connection closure. When a valid closure alert is received, an implementation can be assured
412         that no further data will be received on that connection. TLS implementations <em class="bcp14">MUST</em> initiate an exchange of closure alerts before closing a connection. A TLS implementation <em class="bcp14">MAY</em>, after sending a closure alert, close the connection without waiting for the peer to send its closure alert, generating an
413         "incomplete close". Note that an implementation which does this <em class="bcp14">MAY</em> choose to reuse the session. This <em class="bcp14">SHOULD</em> only be done when the application knows (typically through detecting HTTP message boundaries) that it has received all the
414         message data that it cares about.
415      </p>
416      <p id="rfc.section.2.2.p.2">As specified in <a href="#RFC2246"><cite title="The TLS Protocol Version 1.0">[RFC2246]</cite></a>, any implementation which receives a connection close without first receiving a valid closure alert (a "premature close") <em class="bcp14">MUST NOT</em> reuse that session. Note that a premature close does not call into question the security of the data already received, but
417         simply indicates that subsequent data might have been truncated. Because TLS is oblivious to HTTP request/response boundaries,
418         it is necessary to examine the HTTP data itself (specifically the Content-Length header) to determine whether the truncation
419         occurred inside a message or between messages.
420      </p>
421      <h3 id="rfc.section.2.2.1"><a href="#rfc.section.2.2.1">2.2.1</a>&nbsp;Client Behavior
422      </h3>
423      <p id="rfc.section.2.2.1.p.1">Because HTTP uses connection closure to signal end of server data, client implementations <em class="bcp14">MUST</em> treat any premature closes as errors and the data received as potentially truncated. While in some cases the HTTP protocol
424         allows the client to find out whether truncation took place so that, if it received the complete reply, it may tolerate such
425         errors following the principle to "[be] strict when sending and tolerant when receiving" [RFC1958], often truncation does
426         not show in the HTTP protocol data; two cases in particular deserve special note:
427      </p>
428      <dl class="empty">
429         <dd>A HTTP response without a Content-Length header. Since data length in this situation is signalled by connection close a premature
430            close generated by the server cannot be distinguished from a spurious close generated by an attacker.
431         </dd>
432         <dd>A HTTP response with a valid Content-Length header closed before all data has been read. Because TLS does not provide document
433            oriented protection, it is impossible to determine whether the server has miscomputed the Content-Length or an attacker has
434            truncated the connection.
435         </dd>
436      </dl>
437      <p id="rfc.section.2.2.1.p.3">There is one exception to the above rule. When encountering a premature close, a client <em class="bcp14">SHOULD</em> treat as completed all requests for which it has received as much data as specified in the Content-Length header.
438      </p>
439      <p id="rfc.section.2.2.1.p.4">A client detecting an incomplete close <em class="bcp14">SHOULD</em> recover gracefully. It <em class="bcp14">MAY</em> resume a TLS session closed in this fashion.
440      </p>
441      <p id="rfc.section.2.2.1.p.5">Clients <em class="bcp14">MUST</em> send a closure alert before closing the connection. Clients which are unprepared to receive any more data <em class="bcp14">MAY</em> choose not to wait for the server's closure alert and simply close the connection, thus generating an incomplete close on
442         the server side.
443      </p>
444      <h3 id="rfc.section.2.2.2"><a href="#rfc.section.2.2.2">2.2.2</a>&nbsp;Server Behavior
445      </h3>
446      <p id="rfc.section.2.2.2.p.1">RFC 2616 permits an HTTP client to close the connection at any time, and requires servers to recover gracefully. In particular,
447         servers <em class="bcp14">SHOULD</em> be prepared to receive an incomplete close from the client, since the client can often determine when the end of server data
448         is. Servers <em class="bcp14">SHOULD</em> be willing to resume TLS sessions closed in this fashion.
449      </p>
450      <p id="rfc.section.2.2.2.p.2">Implementation note: In HTTP implementations which do not use persistent connections, the server ordinarily expects to be
451         able to signal end of data by closing the connection. When Content-Length is used, however, the client may have already sent
452         the closure alert and dropped the connection.
453      </p>
454      <p id="rfc.section.2.2.2.p.3">Servers <em class="bcp14">MUST</em> attempt to initiate an exchange of closure alerts with the client before closing the connection. Servers <em class="bcp14">MAY</em> close the connection after sending the closure alert, thus generating an incomplete close on the client side.
455      </p>
456      <h2 id="rfc.section.2.3"><a href="#rfc.section.2.3">2.3</a>&nbsp;Port Number
457      </h2>
458      <p id="rfc.section.2.3.p.1">The first data that an HTTP server expects to receive from the client is the Request-Line production. The first data that
459         a TLS server (and hence an HTTP/TLS server) expects to receive is the ClientHello. Consequently, common practice has been
460         to run HTTP/TLS over a separate port in order to distinguish which protocol is being used. When HTTP/TLS is being run over
461         a TCP/IP connection, the default port is 443. This does not preclude HTTP/TLS from being run over another transport. TLS only
462         presumes a reliable connection-oriented data stream.
463      </p>
464      <div id="rfc.iref.h.1"></div>
465      <div id="rfc.iref.u.1"></div>
466      <h2 id="rfc.section.2.4"><a href="#rfc.section.2.4">2.4</a>&nbsp;URI Format
467      </h2>
468      <p id="rfc.section.2.4.p.1">HTTP/TLS is differentiated from HTTP URIs by using the 'https' protocol identifier in place of the 'http' protocol identifier.
469         An example URI specifying HTTP/TLS is:
470      </p>
471      <div id="rfc.figure.u.1"></div><pre class="text">
473</pre><h1 id="rfc.section.3"><a href="#rfc.section.3">3.</a>&nbsp;Endpoint Identification
474      </h1>
475      <h2 id="rfc.section.3.1"><a href="#rfc.section.3.1">3.1</a>&nbsp;Server Identity
476      </h2>
477      <p id="rfc.section.3.1.p.1">In general, HTTP/TLS requests are generated by dereferencing a URI. As a consequence, the hostname for the server is known
478         to the client. If the hostname is available, the client <em class="bcp14">MUST</em> check it against the server's identity as presented in the server's Certificate message, in order to prevent man-in-the-middle
479         attacks.
480      </p>
481      <p id="rfc.section.3.1.p.2">If the client has external information as to the expected identity of the server, the hostname check <em class="bcp14">MAY</em> be omitted. (For instance, a client may be connecting to a machine whose address and hostname are dynamic but the client knows
482         the certificate that the server will present.) In such cases, it is important to narrow the scope of acceptable certificates
483         as much as possible in order to prevent man in the middle attacks. In special cases, it may be appropriate for the client
484         to simply ignore the server's identity, but it must be understood that this leaves the connection open to active attack.
485      </p>
486      <p id="rfc.section.3.1.p.3">If a subjectAltName extension of type dNSName is present, that <em class="bcp14">MUST</em> be used as the identity. Otherwise, the (most specific) Common Name field in the Subject field of the certificate <em class="bcp14">MUST</em> be used. Although the use of the Common Name is existing practice, it is deprecated and Certification Authorities are encouraged
487         to use the dNSName instead.
488      </p>
489      <p id="rfc.section.3.1.p.4">Matching is performed using the matching rules specified by <a href="#RFC2459"><cite title="Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile">[RFC2459]</cite></a>. If more than one identity of a given type is present in the certificate (e.g., more than one dNSName name, a match in any
490         one of the set is considered acceptable.) Names may contain the wildcard character * which is considered to match any single
491         domain name component or component fragment. E.g., * matches but not f*.com matches
492         but not
493      </p>
494      <p id="rfc.section.3.1.p.5">In some cases, the URI is specified as an IP address rather than a hostname. In this case, the iPAddress subjectAltName must
495         be present in the certificate and must exactly match the IP in the URI.
496      </p>
497      <p id="rfc.section.3.1.p.6">If the hostname does not match the identity in the certificate, user oriented clients <em class="bcp14">MUST</em> either notify the user (clients <em class="bcp14">MAY</em> give the user the opportunity to continue with the connection in any case) or terminate the connection with a bad certificate
498         error. Automated clients <em class="bcp14">MUST</em> log the error to an appropriate audit log (if available) and <em class="bcp14">SHOULD</em> terminate the connection (with a bad certificate error). Automated clients <em class="bcp14">MAY</em> provide a configuration setting that disables this check, but <em class="bcp14">MUST</em> provide a setting which enables it.
499      </p>
500      <p id="rfc.section.3.1.p.7">Note that in many cases the URI itself comes from an untrusted source. The above-described check provides no protection against
501         attacks where this source is compromised. For example, if the URI was obtained by clicking on an HTML page which was itself
502         obtained without using HTTP/TLS, a man in the middle could have replaced the URI. In order to prevent this form of attack,
503         users should carefully examine the certificate presented by the server to determine if it meets their expectations.
504      </p>
505      <h2 id="rfc.section.3.2"><a href="#rfc.section.3.2">3.2</a>&nbsp;Client Identity
506      </h2>
507      <p id="rfc.section.3.2.p.1">Typically, the server has no external knowledge of what the client's identity ought to be and so checks (other than that the
508         client has a certificate chain rooted in an appropriate CA) are not possible. If a server has such knowledge (typically from
509         some source external to HTTP or TLS) it <em class="bcp14">SHOULD</em> check the identity as described above.
510      </p>
511      <h1 id="rfc.references"><a href="#rfc.section.4" id="rfc.section.4">4.</a> References
512      </h1>
513      <table summary="References"> 
514         <tr>
515            <td class="reference"><b id="RFC2459">[RFC2459]</b></td>
516            <td class="top"><a href="" title="SPYRUS">Housley, R.</a>, <a href="" title="VeriSign, Inc.">Ford, W.</a>, <a href="" title="NIST">Polk, T.</a>, and <a href="" title="Citicorp">D. Solo</a>, “<a href="">Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile</a>”, RFC&nbsp;2459, January&nbsp;1999.
517            </td>
518         </tr> 
519         <tr>
520            <td class="reference"><b id="RFC2616">[RFC2616]</b></td>
521            <td class="top"><a href="" title="University of California, Irvine">Fielding, R.</a>, <a href="" title="W3C">Gettys, J.</a>, <a href="" title="Compaq Computer Corporation">Mogul, J.</a>, <a href="" title="MIT Laboratory for Computer Science">Frystyk, H.</a>, <a href="" title="Xerox Corporation">Masinter, L.</a>, <a href="" title="Microsoft Corporation">Leach, P.</a>, and <a href="" title="W3C">T. Berners-Lee</a>, “<a href="">Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1</a>”, RFC&nbsp;2616, June&nbsp;1999.
522            </td>
523         </tr> 
524         <tr>
525            <td class="reference"><b id="RFC2119">[RFC2119]</b></td>
526            <td class="top"><a href="" title="Harvard University">Bradner, S.</a>, “<a href="">Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</a>”, BCP&nbsp;14, RFC&nbsp;2119, March&nbsp;1997.
527            </td>
528         </tr> 
529         <tr>
530            <td class="reference"><b id="RFC2246">[RFC2246]</b></td>
531            <td class="top"><a href="" title="Certicom">Dierks, T.</a> and <a href="" title="Certicom">C. Allen</a>, “<a href="">The TLS Protocol Version 1.0</a>”, RFC&nbsp;2246, January&nbsp;1999.
532            </td>
533         </tr> 
534         <!--WARNING: unused reference 'RFC2817'-->
535         <tr>
536            <td class="reference"><b id="RFC2817">[RFC2817]</b></td>
537            <td class="top">Khare, R. and S. Lawrence, “<a href="">Upgrading to TLS Within HTTP/1.1</a>”, RFC&nbsp;2817, May&nbsp;2000.
538            </td>
539         </tr> 
540      </table>
541      <h1 id="rfc.authors"><a href="#rfc.authors">Author's Address</a></h1>
542      <address class="vcard"><span class="vcardline"><span class="fn">Eric Rescorla</span><span class="n hidden"><span class="family-name">Rescorla</span><span class="given-name">Eric</span></span></span><span class="org vcardline">RTFM, Inc.</span><span class="adr"><span class="street-address vcardline">30 Newell Road, #16</span><span class="vcardline"><span class="locality">East Palo Alto</span>, <span class="region">CA</span>&nbsp;<span class="postal-code">94303</span></span></span><span class="vcardline tel">Phone: <a href="tel:(650)328-8631"><span class="value">(650) 328-8631</span></a></span><span class="vcardline">Email: <a href=""><span class="email"></span></a></span></address>
543      <h1 id="rfc.section.A"><a href="#rfc.section.A">A.</a>&nbsp;Security Considerations
544      </h1>
545      <p id="rfc.section.A.p.1">This entire document is about security.</p>
546      <h1><a id="rfc.copyright" href="#rfc.copyright">Full Copyright Statement</a></h1>
547      <p>Copyright © The Internet Society (2000). All Rights Reserved.</p>
548      <p>This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise
549         explain it or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published and distributed, in whole or in part, without
550         restriction of any kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are included on all such copies and derivative
551         works. However, this document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing the copyright notice or references
552         to the Internet Society or other Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of developing Internet standards
553         in which case the procedures for copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be followed, or as required to
554         translate it into languages other than English.
555      </p>
556      <p>The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assignees.</p>
557      <p>This document and the information contained herein is provided on an “AS IS” basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
560         PURPOSE.
561      </p>
562      <h1><a id="rfc.ipr" href="#rfc.ipr">Intellectual Property</a></h1>
563      <p>The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed
564         to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this document or the extent to which any license under
565         such rights might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it has made any effort to identify any such rights.
566         Information on the IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and standards-related documentation can be
567         found in BCP-11. Copies of claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances of licenses to be made available,
568         or the result of an attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of such proprietary rights by implementors
569         or users of this specification can be obtained from the IETF Secretariat.
570      </p>
571      <p>The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
572         rights which may cover technology that may be required to practice this standard. Please address the information to the IETF
573         Executive Director.
574      </p>
575      <h1>Acknowledgement</h1>
576      <p>Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the Internet Society.</p>
577      <h1 id="rfc.index"><a href="#rfc.index">Index</a></h1>
578      <p class="noprint"><a href="#rfc.index.H">H</a> <a href="#rfc.index.U">U</a> 
579      </p>
580      <div class="print2col">
581         <ul class="ind">
582            <li class="indline0"><a id="rfc.index.H" href="#rfc.index.H"><b>H</b></a><ul class="ind">
583                  <li class="indline1">https URI scheme&nbsp;&nbsp;<a class="iref" href="#rfc.iref.h.1"><b>2.4</b></a></li>
584               </ul>
585            </li>
586            <li class="indline0"><a id="rfc.index.U" href="#rfc.index.U"><b>U</b></a><ul class="ind">
587                  <li class="indline1">URI scheme&nbsp;&nbsp;
588                     <ul class="ind">
589                        <li class="indline1">https&nbsp;&nbsp;<a class="iref" href="#rfc.iref.u.1"><b>2.4</b></a></li>
590                     </ul>
591                  </li>
592               </ul>
593            </li>
594         </ul>
595      </div>
596   </body>
Note: See TracBrowser for help on using the repository browser.